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POLICY CHALLENGE
The EU does not need new sanctions to prevent fiscal crises, but must more
effectively enforce fiscal surveillance provisions, including granting to the
European Commission independent auditing powers. To manage budgetary
crises, the EU should be able to give medium-term financial assistance to
euro-area countries, in cooperation with the International Monetary Fund.
This would not violate the principle of no-coresponsibility for public debts.
To prevent competitiveness
crises, the EU needs strength-
ened surveillance over real
exchange rates, and must use
existing coordination instru-
ments. Governments should
improve monitoring of their
relative competitiveness over
the cycle, learning from
Belgium’s and Finland’s use of
wage guidelines and buffers.
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SUMMARYThe Greek budgetary crisis has provoked a debate about crisis
management and prevention in the euro area. Clarity is needed on the
nature of the challenges and the extent to which the European Union is
already equipped to address them. The Greek situation is ‘mostly fiscal’ and
results from a failure to use fully the instruments at the EU’s disposal. But
another country under pressure, Spain, was fiscally virtuous until the crisis.
Its problems are ‘mostly about competitiveness’ and originated in a domes-
tic credit boom and the wage/price consequences. The EU has instruments
to help address such problems and correct internal imbalances, but in the
first decade of the euro it was too often assumed that threats to stability
could come from budgetary indiscipline only.b
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THE GREEK CRISIS has degenerat-
ed into a much-needed but chaotic
debate about crisis management
and crisis prevention in the euro
area. Intellectual and policy confu-
sion has been widely exposed,
raising questions about the con-
sensus that underpins the single
currency.
To be fair, Greece is a special,
rather pathological case: no other
euro-area country exhibits a simi-
lar combination of budgetary mis-
reporting and misbehaviour.
Nevertheless, many other euro-
area members are having to face
major macroeconomic challenges.
Spain, in particular, exemplifies
another type of crisis that does not
result from a lack of budgetary dis-
cipline, but originates from a
domestic credit boom and its wage
and price consequences.
Global capital markets were first to
sound the alarm about the situa-
tion in several euro
area countries: for
several months,
spreads on bond and
credit default swap
markets signalled
diminishing investor
confidence. Specula-
tors have been
blamed for triggering
crises, but had the
EU acted earlier,
domestic imbalances would not
have resulted in such tensions
over external financing.
The current situation is a severe
test. It is not surprising that it
comes now: a lesson from fixed
exchange-rate regimes is that
weaknesses take several years to
emerge. What is worrying is that
these weaknesses have become
evident at a time when the world
environment is exceptionally
challenging. 
The test concerns the euro area as
a whole. Confidence in the euro is
now affected by increasing doubts
about the area’s functioning and
resilience in times of turmoil. How
this test is tackled will have a deci-
sive bearing on the future of the
euro. If the right lessons are
drawn, the euro will emerge
stronger; if not, it will emerge
weakened.
To meet the challenge, clarity
about the various types of crisis is
needed so that new principles for
action can be established. The
essential pillars governing
Economic and Monetary Union
(EMU) enshrined in the Treaty
remain sound and solid. But prac-
tices and procedures for crisis pre-
vention and crisis management
must be reformed and reinforced.
This Policy Brief
starts by highlight-
ing the two types of
problem that must
be faced today,
namely the results
of budget policy and
threats to competi-
tiveness. We then
turn to governance
reforms, and set out
what needs to be done to tackle
the two types of problem.
1 TWO TYPES OF PROBLEM
The Greek crisis has led to a ten-
dency to view the problems facing
other euro-area countries as being
variations of the Greek case, hence
the infamous 'PIIGS' label
(Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece
and Spain). In reality, however, the
vulnerabilities of these countries
are of a different nature, as are the
reasons why they got into trouble
in the first place.
The Greek and Spanish cases illus-
trate this point well:
• The Greek problem is ‘mostly
fiscal’. Throughout the 2000s,
the country has been running
an irresponsible budgetary poli-
cy while attempting to hide it
(Figure 1a). The problem it
poses is therefore primarily one
of enforcement of the existing
provisions of the Treaty and the
Stability and Growth Pact
(SGP). This is not to deny that
Greece has a competitiveness
problem too. But its first-order
problems are budgetary.
• The Spanish problem is ‘mostly
about competitiveness’. Since
Spain joined the euro, its budg-
etary policy has been remark-
ably disciplined – with even a
substantial surplus in 2005-
2007 – and its budgetary
reporting has been fairly accu-
rate (Figure 1b). Spain's main
problem relates to a private
sector-induced construction
boom and to poor economic
performance in the rest of the
economy, which economic poli-
cy has failed to correct.
Competitiveness woes have
resulted in fiscal strains, but
the origin of the difficulties is
not budgetary in nature. 
Before the crisis, there was a
strong belief in the EU that budget-
ary discipline was the ‘mother of
all policies’. Accordingly, budget-
ary surveillance was deemed suf-
ficient to prevent instability. The
‘The Greek crisis has
exposed intellectual
and policy confusion,
raising questions
about the consensus
that underpins the
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Source: Bruegel calculations based on European Commission, DG ECFIN. Notified deficits are the estimates released in spring of the following year.
implicit assumption was that the
private sector is inherently stable. 
The dangers of such neglect start-
ed to become apparent at the
beginning of the crisis, as empha-
sised in the European Commission
report on the first ten years of the
euro (European Commission,
2008). These dangers have since
become obvious.
To illustrate the point, Table 1
shows Spain’s competitiveness
relative to the rest of the euro area.
From 1998 to 2007, relative pro-
duction costs increased signifi-
cantly, particularly in the tradable
Figure 1: Notified versus actual budget balances
Table 1: Indicators of the competitiveness of the Spanish economy
Relative
labour costs *
Relative wage costs
in manufacturing **
Manufacturing/total
employment (%)
Construction/total
employment (%)
Current account
balance (% of GDP)
1998 100.0 100.0 18.6 9.8 -1.1
1999 100.7 97.4 18.4 10.4 -2.7
2000 102.2 100.0 18.1 11.1 -4.0
2001 102.9 100.9 17.8 11.6 -4.3
2002 103.3 101.6 17.6 11.7 -3.8
2003 104.0 104.9 17.1 11.8 -4.0
2004 105.7 107.6 16.7 12.1 -5.9
2005 107.9 111.9 16.1 12.5 -7.5
2006 110.5 115.6 15.5 12.8 -9.0
2007 113.0 118.3 14.9 13.1 -10.0
Source: Bruegel calculations based on AMECO and Price and Cost Competitiveness Databases. Note: * REER vs EU16 based on unit labour costs, total
economy. Normalised as 1998=100; ** REER vs EU16 based on unit wage costs, manufacturing. Normalised as 1998=100
goods sector, leading to a shrink-
ing of manufacturing. This was a
consequence of the country’s real
estate investment boom, which
attracted a progressively bigger
share of the labour force. However,
there were also other factors
behind poor international cost
competitiveness, namely i) wage
indexation to past high inflation,
and ii) the automatic extension of
wage increases agreed at industry
level to all firms and regions, inde-
pendently of local conditions. The
final result was a significant cur-
rent account deficit that peaked at
10 percent of GDP in 2007.
Imbalances of the kind described
above do in fact arise independ-
ently of the fiscal policy stance. To
show this, in Figure 2a (overleaf),
we plot for the euro-area countries
and the countries in a fixed
exchange-rate regime the change
in the current-account balance
between 1999 and 2007, and the
change in the actual budget bal-
ance relative to the average of
each country’s main trading part-
ners (EU12). Figure 2b shows the
same but for 2007 – the last year
before the crisis. In both cases,
there is no strong correlation
between the two variables.Lack of budgetary discipline has
always – rightly – been consid-
ered a major potential threat to the
stability of the euro. Competitive-
ness problems, however, can also
pose a serious threat. In the euro
area, a competitiveness shortfall
in the traded sector can only be
corrected by a long and painful
adjustment. This would have seri-
ous employment and distributive
consequences that might be hard
to sustain politically, especially in
large, not very open economies
like Spain.
2 HOW TO DEAL WITH BUDGETARY
CRISES
Fiscal indiscipline raises ques-
tions, first, about prevention, and,
second, about crisis management.
A. Crisis prevention
It has been suggested (Schäuble,
2010) that in order to enforce
budgetary discipline the EU needs
to have the nuclear option of
expelling a country from the euro
area. It may indeed be useful to
think the unthinkable, though the
notion that large countries would
expel small ones runs against the
very idea of the EU project. Be that
as it may, the problems in the
Greek case were created simply by
the lack of implementation of mun-
dane policing provisions.
The prevention of budgetary prob-
lems is first and foremost a matter
of enforcing existing provisions,
namely the SGP, and the attendant
EU rules on the quality of statisti-
cal data reported by governments
1.
The Greek case represents a failure
on both fronts. No sanction was
applied for violation of the SGP and
the statistical rules
2.
So the agenda for the euro area is
merely one of enforcing existing
rules.  
Recommendations
• In-depth auditing. The Euro-
pean Commission should be
given proper auditing powers,
as envisaged in its proposal of
15 February
3. The proposal fore-
sees 'in-depth methodological
visits' to member states by
Eurostat, going beyond the
mere checking of compliance
with statistical standards.
Eurostat would also be granted
access to all the information
required for assessing the qual-
ity of statistical data. Such
external oversight is particular-
ly welcome in countries that
lack an independent fiscal
authority, such as Greece and
Ireland
4.
• Stress-testing of budgetary
positions.The fast deterioration
of the budgetary situation in
several countries has highlight-
ed that apparently strong budg-
etary positions were in fact pre-
carious because they were
based on an unsustainable evo-
lution of tax receipts. This calls
for a less formulistic, smarter
approach to budgetary disci-
pline whereby budgetary posi-
tions would be tested against a
range of possible economic
scenarios.
• Providing incentives for budget
reform. While tightening fiscal
surveillance, the EU should also
provide incentives to improve
the quality of national budget-
ary institutions. The Comm-
ission should differentiate its
budgetary surveillance proce-
dures depending on the quality
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1. Council Regulation
(EC) No 3605/93 of 22
November 1993;
Council Regulation (EC)
No 2103/2005 of 12
December 2005;
Council Regulation (EC)
No 479/2009 of 25
May 2009.
2. In 2004, the
Commission opened an
infringement procedure
against Greece for mis-
reporting deficit figures
but the procedure was
closed in 2007. See
Commission (2010). 
3. COM(2010)53.
4. European
Commission, Fiscal
Governance Database. 
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Figure 2: The weak correlation between fiscal and current account positions, 1999-2007of domestic budgetary institu-
tions, especially statistical
institutes and fiscal oversight
councils. 
B. Crisis management 
Crises happen even with the most
elaborate crisis-prevention regime,
raising the question of the quality
and effectiveness of the crisis-
management regime. The euro
area's problem is that it does not
have a defined crisis-management
regime in place. 
Had Greece been an EU country
outside the euro area it would have
by now turned to the International
Monetary Fund for financial assis-
tance, just as Hungary, Latvia and
Romania did a few months ago.
Like these countries, along with
the conditional IMF loan, Greece
would have probably received an
EU conditional loan under the
medium-term financial assistance
(MTFA) facility.
Being a member of the euro area,
Greece retains the option of
obtaining financial assistance
from the IMF. However it is not eligi-
ble for MTFA assistance because
Article 143 of the Lisbon Treaty
explicitly reserves such assis-
tance to member states ‘with a
derogation’, ie those outside the
euro area. This clause has general-
ly been interpreted as one element
of the Treaty's prohibition on bail-
ing-out euro-area countries with
budgetary problems. Such an
interpretation is plainly wrong.
Article 125 of the Treaty explicitly
prohibits the EU and individual
member states from being ‘liable
for or assum[ing] the commit-
ments of... any (other) member
BOX 1: THE ORIGINS OF ARTICLE 143
This article derives from Article 109h of the Maastricht Treaty (later
renumbered Article 119), which itself derives from Article 108 of the
1957 Treaty of Rome. The only substantive difference between Article
108 and the later versions is the distinction between member states with
a derogation (and therefore not participating in the third stage of EMU)
and the others.
Why was this distinction introduced by Maastricht? Why were euro-area
members made ineligible for mutual assistance? The short and full
answer is simply that the assistance scheme was intended to address
balance-of-payments problems, and that these problems were expected
to disappear as a result of these countries forming a monetary union. The
exclusion of euro-area members from mutual assistance is purely the
consequence of what was considered to be self-evident at the time of
Maastricht. It has nothing to do, as many assume today, with the no-
coresponsibility principle.
The correctness of our interpretation has been confirmed by many per-
sons who were involved in the Maastricht Treaty negotiations. It is also
attested by several Community documents: the original machinery for
MTFA in case of  balance-of-payments difficulties was set up by a Council
Decision of March 1971, which makes no reference to monetary union
and, therefore, no distinction between the members and non-members of
such a union. The MTFA facility was revised by a Council Regulation of
June 1988 , three years before Maastricht was signed. The 1988
Regulation clearly specifies that ‘the financing obligations on member
states under the machinery for medium-term financial assistance
[should] remain in force until the final stage of the European Monetary
System’, ie until the creation of monetary union. This echoes the view of
the 1970 Werner Report that ‘In such [a monetary] union, all that mat-
ters is the global balance of payments vis-à-vis the outside world.’
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state’. This no-coresponsibility
principle was introduced into the
EU Treaty at the time of Maastricht,
and is an essential pillar of EMU. It
is clear and sound, and should
remain untouched. However,
Article 143 is totally different. It is
not about the EU or any member
state  assuming the liabilities of
another member state, but about
granting a loanto a member state.
It has a different origin in the his-
tory of EMU to Article 125 (see Box
1), and should not be interpreted
as a no-assistance principle, for
two reasons:
• First, euro-area members
remain members of the IMF and
therefore have access to condi-
tional assistance. It would be
illogical for the EU to ban assis-
tance to its members while
allowing them to get assistance
from the IMF.
• Second, the availability of
assistance does not necessari-
ly create moral hazard if it is
subject to proper conditionality.
Lingering confusion between no-
coresponsibility and no-assis-
tance has been a damagingfeature of the recent European dis-
cussion on crisis management
5.
This should be remedied by stick-
ing to the no-coresponsibility prin-
ciple while putting in place a clear
and predictable conditional assis-
tance regime.
The question then is who should
be in charge of crisis management
in the euro area? The IMF, the EU, or
both together?
A purely IMF approach is not desir-
able because it would risk creating
incompatibility between IMF and
EU policy requirements. Whereas
the IMF has full leeway when nego-
tiating a programme with a coun-
try that is not part of a regional
arrangement, EU members (and
especially euro-area members)
are part of a policy system that
needs to be taken into account
when designing a programme. 
A purely EU solution would also
have problems. First, it would
amount to creating an entirely new
legal and financial apparatus. IMF
conditional assistance rests on
specific agreements, procedures
and instruments that do not exist
in the EU. This is why the EU relies
on joint programmes with the IMF
for providing assistance to its non-
euro members: it makes good
sense for the European
Commission to benefit from the
IMF's extensive worldwide experi-
ence. The second problem is that
EU loans under the  balance-of-
payments programme are
financed exclusively by funds
raised by the EU on capital mar-
kets. These EU bonds are, however,
fully guaranteed by the EU budget.
As long as the sums involved are
relatively small, as in the case of
Hungary, Latvia and Romania, the
tiny size of the EU budget is not a
severe constraint. The matter
would be totally different if larger
EU countries needed assistance.
These considerations call for
establishing a framework for joint
EU-IMF assistance to countries in
the euro area. A solution of this
sort could also serve as a model
for IMF agreements with other
regional groupings, not least the
Asian Chiang Mai initiative, and
could help make cooperation
between the IMF and such group-
ings more effective and efficient. 
Recommendations
• Extending Article 143 to euro-
area countries. It would be
desirable to modify Article 143
so that the EU conditional loan
facility can be made available to
euro-area members facing
financing difficulties. Loans
could still be granted, as has
always been the case with
MTFA loans
6, as part of a pack-
age of aid put together with the
IMF, a possibility that Article
143 makes explicit. 
• Defining a framework for joint
EU-IMF assistance to euro-area
members. This framework
should outline the principles
and procedures for cooperation,
and, in particular, make clear
that the conditions set by the
IMF for assisting a euro-area
country have to be consistent
with euro-area rules.
3 HOW TO DEAL WITH
COMPETITIVENESS CRISES
The EU is not short of policy-coordi-
nation instruments. Quite the con-
trary, there is a variety of rules and
procedures, from the Treaty itself
to the Broad Economic Policy
Guidelines and the Open Method of
Coordination. Article 121 is the
basis for economic surveillance,
both in a bilateral and a multilater-
al perspective. The Treaty does not
foresee sanctions in this area but,
as appropriate for policy coordina-
tion, softer instruments are avail-
able, such as Commission warn-
ings and Council recommenda-
tions. The new Article 136 of the
Lisbon Treaty calls for a strength-
ening of this coordination within
the euro area. Last but not least,
the Eurogroup was created to mon-
itor economic developments and
serve as a forum for coordination.
However, the EU track record in
this area is poor. The Broad
Economic Policy Guidelines are
largely ignored by national policy
makers, recommendations have
been acted on only once since the
introduction of the euro – and in
an ineffective way
7. There has
been a failure, if not to diagnose,
then at least to trigger appropriate
responses to massive changes in
relative competitiveness. And the
Eurogroup has not taken advan-
tage of its informality to address
problems as they develop and trig-
ger appropriate policy responses
by national governments. 
It is now of utmost importance
that the EU develops an agreed
analytical framework for assess-
ing potential imbalances, setting
goals and triggering action.
One approach would be to replicate
for current account balances what
already exists for budgetary bal-
ances
8. There is, however, a funda-
mental difference between the
two: whereas there is broad
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5. See for example
Issing (2010).
6. There have only been
six instances of medi-
um-term financial
assistance to EU coun-
tries: Italy (1974),
Greece (1991), Italy
(1993), Hungary
(2008), Latvia (2009)
and Romania (2009). 
7. In February 2001,
the ECOFIN Council
issued its first Article
99(4) (non-binding)
recommendation
against Ireland for run-
ning a fiscal policy that
was inconsistent with
the objective of macro-
economic stability. The
Council’s move spurred
a heated debate, not
least because, at the
time, Ireland was actu-
ally running a fiscal
surplus, and because
its exports were thriv-
ing. The recommenda-
tion was essentially
ignored by the Irish
government.
TWO CRISES, TWO RESPONSESagreement on desirable budgetary
outcomes, it would be absurd to
impose balanced or near-balanced
current accounts. One motive   for
the euro was indeed to encourage
flows of savings across borders.
Furthermore, economic analysis
does not provide numerical bench-
marks for determining what is a
‘good’ current-account balance
(Blanchard and Milesi-Ferretti,
2009). Thresholds can be used to
trigger examination and assess-
ment, not to determine policy
action. 
A more promising avenue is to
monitor wage and price develop-
ments systematically – in effect to
carry out surveillance of real
exchange rates. The EU has a tradi-
tion in this respect, which was
strangely discontinued with the
introduction of the euro: in the
Exchange Rate Mechanism, no
country could realign (change its
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8. Dullien and
Schwarzer (2009).
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nominal exchange rate) without
the consent of its partners precise-
ly because of the effect on com-
petitiveness (ie real exchange
rates). But nowadays a country
can unilaterally modify its real
exchange rate, for example
through a combination of VAT
increases and cuts in social secu-
rity contributions.
Evidently, the purpose of this sur-
veillance should not be to prevent
changes in the real exchange rate,
when they are justified on grounds
of relative economic performance.
As Figure 3 shows, the perform-
ances of euro-area members in
this respect vary.
Whether the focus is on current
account balances or real exchange
rates, the surveillance process
must have a strong euro-area
dimension because, barring
changes for the area as a whole, a
country’s current account deficit
(or competitiveness loss) is
another country’s surplus (or com-
petitiveness gain). Therefore,
analyses need to be done and rec-
ommendations made for all the
players in the system. As recog-
nised in the Eurogroup note of 15
March (Eurogroup, 2010), when
adjustment is needed, it concerns
both deficit and surplus countries.
At the national level, governments
should monitor competitiveness
and act when needed. Most lack an
appropriate policy framework and
instruments, but some do have
them (Box 2, overleaf). These
(mixed) experiences could provide
inspiration for governments to put
in place mechanisms adapted to
the institutional features of
national wage and price-setting.
Recommendations
• European competitiveness-
monitoring framework. The
Commission should take
responsibility for periodic
reporting on real exchange
rates in the euro area, and
should propose a policy agenda
for the discussion within the
Eurogroup, whenever it is felt
that economic developments
‘risk jeopardising the proper
functioning of EMU’ (Art. 121). 
• A tentative alert procedure. It
may be appropriate to set up an
alert procedure that calls for a
specific Commission assess-
ment whenever the changes in
a country’s current-account
balance  or real exchange rate
over a period of several years
exceed predefined thresholds.
The assessment should take
into account a range of country-
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Figure 3: Real exchange rate and relative export performance*
Source: Bruegel calculations based on DG ECFIN and Eurostat. * Cumulative change between 1999
and 2008. Real exchange rates are based on unit labour costs.b
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specific and euro area-wide fac-
tors. On the basis of the assess-
ment, warnings could be issued
by the Commission. If the
Commission judges after one
year that the response of the
country or countries concerned
has not been satisfactory, it
should make a proposal to the
Eurogroup to issue
recommendations.
• National competitiveness-
monitoring frameworks.EU sur-
veillance cannot substitute
national vigilance. Govern-
ments should put in place com-
petitiveness-monitoring frame-
works consisting of regular
assessments and the definition
of potential instruments for
remedial action. 
The authors are grateful to Juan
Ignacio Aldasoro and Hélène
Vuillermet for very effective
research assistance. 
BOX 2: WAGE GUIDELINES AND WAGE BUFFERS
THE BELGIAN AND FINNISH EXAMPLES
In 1996, the Belgian Parliament approved a law to keep the evolution of
wages in Belgium in line with that of wages in its main trading partners in
order to preserve the country’s competitiveness in EMU. Every two years,
the Central Economic Council of Belgium publishes a report on the maxi-
mum margins for nominal wage increases on the basis of the expected
evolution in Germany, France and the Netherlands. Social partners then
decide on a (maximum) wage increase. The law makes provision for this
norm to be made mandatory through a government decision. This has
only happened once, in 1997-1998. Since then, the norm has been con-
sidered ‘indicative’. Indeed probably because of its non-binding character,
the measure has not always served the purpose for which it was
designed. After 1998 Belgian wages repeatedly overshot those of trading
partners. Moreover, in December 2008, the social partners could not
agree on a guideline for 2009-2010.
In 1997, Finland introduced, in agreement with its social partners, an
ingenious adjustment mechanism to balance out cyclical changes in EMU.
The key idea is to act on the non-wage component of labour costs. During
good times, employers and employees pay slightly higher than necessary
social security contributions. The funds thus raised are used to pay social
security costs when there is an adverse cyclical shock. The funds are
meant to reduce the pressure to cut jobs and wages during recessions.
While the buffer is unlikely to be enough during a long recession, it is use-
ful for increasing the flexibility of labour costs over a normal cycle.
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